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Abstract 
 
Using data from Estonian manufacturing firms during the period 1995-1999 we apply 
panel data techniques, in particular the Arellano-Bond (1991) method to investigate the 
investment behaviour. We employ the model of optimal capital accumulation in the 
presence of convex adjustment costs. We find that the domestic companies seem to be 
more financial constrained than those with the presence of foreign investors. Furthermore 
we find that smaller firms are more constrained than their larger counterparts. 
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1. Introduction 
The assumption of perfect capital markets and of investment decisions being independent 
of financial factors (Modigliani and Miller 1958) may be still a useful approximation for 
many purposes. Yet we know by now that it can be refuted by empirical data. If  internal 
and the external capital are not perfect substitutes, then investment may depend on 
financial factors, such as the availability of internal finance or the functioning of credit 
markets. Thus, a “financing hierarchy” exists, in which internal funds have a cost 
advantage over issuing new debt or equity finance. While a series of empirical studies is 
available no visible consensus on methodology and on interpretation on findings exists. 
On the contrary, investment remains one of the most disputed topics. For that reason we 
believe that it is still an area, where empirical results count, and even a modest 
contribution like ours may still posses some value added. We do not aim to advance 
theory. Instead, we focus on econometric work, apply a simple design, which addresses 
the issue of endogeneity of firms’ groupings. Our main focus of interest is the difference 
between companies with foreign owners and those with domestic owners in respect of 
financial constraints. Does a company with foreign ownership have an advantage in terms 
of overcoming financial constraints and in better access to financial capital than its 
domestic counterpart? Our data is from a small open, advanced transition economy, 
Estonia. During the period we analyse (1995-1999), it experienced a major inflow of 
foreign capital. This process of building up of foreign presence after initial opening 
indicates that foreign ownership cannot be taken as exogenous factor. Taking that into 
account, we establish that foreign companies are less financially constrained. So are 
larger companies. These results shed some light on the process of foreign direct 
investment and the nature of owner specific advantages of foreign investors. 
 
2. Investment in a transition economy 
Firstly we give a brief overview of investment at the aggregate level in Estonia during the 
period which corresponds to our sample.
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After collapsing at the beginning of the transition period, investment in manufacturing 
recovered and impressive growth rates of production and investment were recorded in 
late 1990’s, albeit the slow down in production in 1999 was accompanied again by falling 
investment levels. Disappointing results in 1999 reflect the impact of the Russian crisis of 
1998, which affected several neighbouring economies, including Estonia. As might be 
expected, variation in investment rates is much higher than in production. One could also 
notice some indication that acceleration/decelaration in production growth lead to 
acceleration/deceleration in investment rates with a one-year delay correspondingly. 
Wide variation in investment rates may be indicative of capital market imperfections, as 
investment becomes dependent on retained earnings and those in turn are sensitive to the 
dynamics of demand. As stated by Bond and Meghir (1994): “the way in which 
investment responds to transitory demand shocks and to cyclical variation in profits 
crucially depends on whether internal finance constraints capital expenditure”. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Indicators based on the sample are different; in particular, aggregate data capture the impact of both 
outflow of firms and inflow of new entrants, thus they better characterise the overall situation in 
manufacturing. 
Figure 1. Value Added, Investment and Profitability in Estonian Manufacturing
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So far investment in transition economies attracted little attention from researchers, 
especially on a micro-level. Existing studies on firm investment behaviour at the firm 
level in transition economies include Konings et al. (2002), Lizal and Svenjar (2002) and 
Prasnikar and Svenjar (1998). This gap in the literature may be explained by two 
problems. Firstly, the data on assets was of low quality or  unavailable for the early 
transition period. Secondly, evidence from macroeconomic studies indicated that there 
was no correlation between investment and production dynamics for the early transition 
period. That is due to the fact that initially, most efficiency gains could be achieved by 
reallocation and reorganisation, which required little investment in fixed assets.
2 Yet, 
several years into the transition process, those ‘shallow’ sources of productivity gains are 
no longer predominant and it becomes clear that firms need to invest in order to 
modernise obsolete capital, as the process is crucial for strategic restructuring. However 
in a situation of poorly working capital markets this is not an easy task.  
Colombo and Driffill (2003) highlight problems experienced in financial institutions 
during the initial transition period, where a banking system needed to be developed 
which could judge and monitor the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, along with 
channelling resources to worthy investment projects. In particular they note the problems 
found in the financial sector such as bad loans, bankruptcies, and poor stock market 
development.  Lizal and Svenjar (2002) also note the problems associated with corruption 
in the banking system in transition economies, such as the “old boys” network of 
extending credit to existing clients. Some authors argue that as a result of this and other 
macro influences, transition economies suffered from the “credit crunch” (Calvo and 
Coricelli, 1994). Financing for the small and medium enterprises remain a problem, with 
serious economic implications, as the initially underdeveloped SME sector plays 
important role in generating employment and production growth. While bank 
reorganisation and reform had occurred during the 1990’s, the financial system remains 
underdeveloped. Also, new equity issues play a small role as a source of capital for 
                                                           
2 For a recent contribution and further references to the empirical literature on macroeconomic growth in 
transition countries, see Falcetti et al. (2002). Notably, neither this nor earlier studies include investment 
variables.  
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investment. In such an environment, access to foreign capital may play an important role 
overcoming these financial constraints. 
Our research motivation is to investigate how this situation impacts on firm investment 
behaviour. Do companies with foreign owners enjoy an advantage vis-à-vis domestic 
firms in their access to finance? Are small companies constrained in their investment and 
growth? Do small companies rely on internal finance only? 
The dominant trend in the literature was to assume that if firms rely on internal sources of 
finance then we can conclude that capital markets are not working correctly, and thus 
firms are “credit constrained”. We now turn to this issue. 
 
3. Alternative research frameworks 
 
Here we refer briefly to alternative specifications of the investment equations present in 
contemporary literature. Jorgenson (1971) offers a classic review of earlier investment 
theories. 
 
Firstly, the acceleration principle links the demand for capital goods to the level or 
change in a firm’s output or sales. Examples of empirical research based on this model 
include Fazzari et al. (1998), who include contemporaneous sales (as well as several lags) 
in their investment equation, Hall et al. (1998a) and Konings et al. (2002) for transition 
economies.  
Hall et al. (1998a) successfully apply the accelerator model in similar samples of firms in  
US and France for the period 1978-89. Their regression results show that sales dynamics 
positively affect investment in both the US and France (with long run impact of sales on 
the desired level of capital being close to one in US, although the coefficient is 
imprecisely determined for France). In addition, sensitivity of investment to cash flow, 
which was detectable for 1970s for both countries,  no longer exists  in the period 1985-
1993, which may be interpreted as an improvement in the way the capital market operate 
there. 
Nevertheless, the sales accelerator also has its drawbacks. One such criticism is that it 
does not include the relative price of capital in the empirical specification.  
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Secondly, specifications based on  Tobin’s Q may be derived from more general 
optimisation models. According to this methodology, the market value of the firm affects 
investment. The Tobin Q framework states that a value maximising firm will invest as 
long as the shadow value of an additional unit of capital, marginal q, is no smaller than 
unity. One advantage of this approach is that Q can control for the market’s evaluation of 
the firm’s investment opportunities. However, Schiantarelli (1996) argues that average Q 
may be a very imprecise proxy for the shadow value of an additional unit of new capital 
(p74). As a result Q is an inefficient method of measuring investment opportunities. And, 
Weller (2000) argues that the Tobin’s Q approach may not be practical in a transition 
environment as capital markets are underdeveloped, which makes it very difficult to 
arrive at market valuations (p10). 
 
Thirdly, estimation of the optimum capital accumulation model, which uses the Euler 
equation, avoids relying on measures of profitability based on the firm’s market value. 
Instead it states that the value of marginal product of capital today, after adjustment costs, 
should equal the cost of a new machine, minus the cost savings resulting from the fact 
that the firm can invest less tomorrow while still maintaining the capital stock on its 
optimal path (Schiantarelli, 1996, p76). The resulting investment equation can be 
successfully estimated by IV or GMM econometric techniques, using lagged values of 
the variables as instruments. Unfortunately, the Euler equation approach also suffers from 
some drawbacks. In particular, in the case of liquidity constraints this approach may be 
unable to detect the presence of financial constraints, if the tightness of such constraints 
is constant over time. In addition, this method can be prone to parameter instability, 
suggesting the existence of specification problems (Ibid, p.77). Hall et al. (1998a) also 
criticise the Euler equation for being ‘fragile’. Another point is that there is more than 
one model of optimisation that has similar empirical implications. In particular, the 
typical assumption is that there are convex adjustment costs. That implies more 
investment after a bad shock and less after a positive one, as companies aim at smoothing 
net cash flow after investment over time. Interestingly, Carceles-Poveda (2003) proves 
that the similar behavioural implication may follow from an alternative assumption that  
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the firm is risk averse, in the broader model of utility maximising, in place of value 
maximising. 
 
Our highly stylised conclusions are the following. The approach based on Tobin Q is not 
applicable in case of Estonian data, as it is not in most economies apart from a group of 
highly developed economies with well functioning capital markets. The simple reason for 
it is that the stock market valuation is not available in a prevailing number of cases. That 
leaves us with a choice between the accelerator model and the model based on Euler 
equation. We think that the latter has more appeal due to fact that it is based on implicit 
optimisation modelling. Yet, it proved to be difficult to estimate in other studies and, 
ultimately, our choice is conditional on econometric viability. We would turn to 
accelerator model in the case where we cannot obtain consistent estimates of the model 
derived from optimisation of capital accumulation. 
 
 
4. Financial performance, availability of internal funds and investment 
 
The nature of the link between financing constraints and investment is a highly debated 
issue in the literature on investment. One stream of literature shows that high sensitivity 
and positive response of investment to cash flow can be interpreted as evidence of 
financial constraints and demonstrate an empirical link with the likely predictors of 
existence of credit constraints. In particular, some researchers clasify firms on the basis 
of dividend- payout behaviour (Fazzari et al, 1988), association with banks or business 
groups (Hoshi et al, 1991), ownership (Lizal and Svenjar, 2002, among others) and firm 
size (see Schiantarelli 1996 and Hubbard 1998 for reviews of all but most recent 
literature).
3 One outstanding example of this approach is Bond and Meghir (1994), who 
develop a model incorporating the hierarchy of finance, relying on both dividend 
behaviour and issue of new shares. The investment behaviour of firms should differ 
across different financial regimes. They argue that Euler equation can be estimated 
consistently for two categories of companies: /i/ those, which can generate abundant  
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internal funds in relation to perceived investment opportunities, and therefore pay 
positive dividends, /ii/ the companies, which issue new stock to finance investment. In 
between those two, we have the third category of companies, which neither pay dividends 
nor finance new investment by issuing new shares. In this group, investment would 
depend on unobservable value of constraint on dividend payments. The companies are 
liquidity constrained in a sense that ‘a windfall addition to current earnings, which 
conveys no information about the firm’s future prospects, will result in an increase in 
investment’ (Ibid., p.203). This group of firm may be characterised by excess sensitivity 
of investment to measures of internal finance. 
However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000) and Cleary (1999) present empirical 
evidence intended to demonstrate that investment-cash flow sensitivity is not a useful 
measure of financial constraints, due to non-monotonicities. While their conclusions were 
in turn questioned by Fazzari et al. (2000), the debate is not concluded. In particular, 
Kaplan and Zingales (2000) notice that some prominent companies (like Microsoft) have 
high cash balances and avoid dividend payments, while investment remain very sensitive 
to cash flow. They notice that one explanation of this, may rely to so called ‘flypaper 
effect’, which is discussed by Hines and Thaler (1995). According to the latter authors, 
while “the distinction between having money on hand and being able to raise money 
without difficulty should have no impact on spending decisions”, in practice “when it 
comes to predict the behaviour of governments, organisations and individuals, it is 
important to distinguish between the resources they have on hand and resources they 
could easily get” (Ibid., pp. 224-225). Correspondingly, larger volume of cash flow may 
lead to more investment.  
A similar, more elaborate hypothesis was proposed in an important stream of literature 
linked with Jensen (1986) who developed the “free cash flow” approach. According to 
this, the managers maximise objectives, which are not in common with shareholders’ 
interests, with managers aiming to increase firm size, as this boosts their pay, status and 
power. Thus the cash flows that are at the disposal of managers after valuable/efficient 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 Other possible classifications include financial leverage, ownership concentration and different time  
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investment is carried out, is “free cash flow”. Managers may then still take on more 
investment projects at the expense of shareholders, increasing firm size but at the cost of 
lower net present value. Consequently cash flow and investment may be positively 
related and this is an alternative explanation as compared with the financial constraints 
hypothesis, and may explain the puzzling behaviour of firms like Microsoft . 
Nevertheless, inefficient use of resources is still implied, as in the credit constraint 
hypotheses; it is just the sources of the problem are different. 
 
Ownership and corporate governance 
Ownership structure or corporate governance is also often considered when examining 
investment. The characteristics of corporate control structures and identity of owners may 
correspond to the degree in which firms are hindered by information and incentive 
problems in capital markets, and thus investment may have various degrees of sensitivity 
to liquidity. Alternatively, it may affect investment behaviour due to the fact that 
parameters of the objective function would vary. 
Hoshi  et al. (1991) examine whether liquidity is a more relevant determinant of 
investment for Japanese firms which are affiliated to a keiretsu or industrial group with 
close links to banks, or those firms which are independent of such an alliance.  They split 
their panel of 145 Japanese manufacturing firms on the grounds of whether there are 
independent or not from an industrial group, and more specifically if they have a close 
relationship with a major bank. Their main result shows that the liquidity variable - cash 
flow
4, is more important for the independent firms, than for those firms affiliated to an 
industrial group. They argue that the reason for this is the fact that those firms who have 
a close link to banks are able to minimise the cost of raising capital, and thus investment 
is less sensitive to liquidity constraints. In contrast, firms that are independent of an 
industrial group are more prone to relying on internal funds, caused by the additional 
costs of raising external finance. 
Hall et al. (1998b) study the determinants of investment in scientific firms for US, France 
and Japan (1979-1989) and find that the link between investment, profit, sales and cash 
                                                                                                                                                                             
periods (as, say, related to business cycle phases). 
4 Measured in their study by net (after tax) income plus depreciation, less dividend payments.  
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flow differs for each. Investment is more sensitive to cash flow in the US, compared to 
France or Japan. The authors argue that it reflects the different corporate governance 
structures, which operate in each country. Firms in the US do not enjoy close links with 
banks, as do firms in Japan, so the cost of external finance maybe higher, forcing firms to 
rely more on internal funds. 
Degrsye and de Jong (2000) also hypothesise that corporate governance will affect 
investment expenditure. In their specification they interact the cash flow variable with 
their data on corporate governance, such as board structure, ownership and bank 
relations. Their findings relating to this issue show that firm-bank relations and the size 
of the largest shareholder have no impact on investment. However, the size of insider 
equity increases the impact of cash flow upon investment.  
Galindo and Schiantarelli (2002) provide an overview of recent research on investment 
financing in Latin America, with evidence that firms with foreign ownership are less 
restricted in their access to finance. On the other hand, Columbo (2001) found no 
significant impact of foreign ownership for Hungary on access to short term debt. In turn, 
Harrison and McMillan (2003) apply the augmented Euler equation to demonstrate that 
foreign companies are less credit constrained than domestic firms for the sample of firms 
taken from the Ivory Coast. 
Foreign ownership may be conductive to easier access to finance not just because of 
direct funding from foreign partners and generally foreign sources of finance, but also 
because firms with some degree of foreign ownership enjoy less bankruptcy risk and 
adopt international standards faster in terms of product quality and therefore find it easier 
to gain access to domestic bank debt (Columbo 2001; Harrison and McMillan 2003). 
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Firm size 
Why smaller companies may be constrained in their access to financing? One possible 
explanation is that providers of finance face some fixed costs of evaluating the project. 
This assumption alone will be sufficient to create a bias against smaller firms. Moreover, 
smaller firms may be more likely to be the subject of idiosyncratic risk and are less likely 
to have developed a good reputation with investors, as small firms are more typically 
start-ups with no long credit history (Schiantarelli 1996; Colombo and Driffill 2003). 
However empirical evidence is mixed and the conclusions may be specific to particular 
countries / types of financial systems. Fazzari et al.(1988) investigates the link between 
firms size and access to capital: in times of tight credit small and medium firms are often 
denied funds, in favour of better quality borrowers (p153). Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) 
show that there is a strong correlation between firm size and the scope of external 
finance: smaller firms rely on intermediary finance, while larger firms are not restricted 
in their access to capital market. In addition, they use data on manufacturing US firms 
from 1958 to the early 1990’s in order to determine how small and large firms adjust their 
behaviour to macroeconomic conditions. Their results show that small firms scale back 
borrowing more than larger firms as a result of negative shocks and that small firms are 
more prone to liquidity constraints. Large firms are able to borrow in the event of an 
economic downturn, but small firms are unable to. Lizar and Svejnar (2002) split their 
sample for firms which have  greater than or equal to 100 employees (“large firms”) and 
“small firms”, which have less than 100 employees. From this exercise they find 
evidence of credit rationing (i.e. a positive relationship between profit and investment) in 
only smaller, private firms. In contrast, larger firms have virtually unlimited access to 
capital and therefore there exists a negative relationship between profit and investment 
for these firms. 
However, contrasting results were obtained as well. For instance, both Hu and 
Schiantarelli (1994) and Kadapakkam et al. (1998) found that ceteris paribus, size is 
positively associated with the probability of a firm being financially constrained. Several 
explanations are put forward by those authors. Banks may face trade-off between higher 
evaluation and preparation cost for multiple small and medium size loans and higher risk 
resulting from a focus on smaller number of large projects. Agency problems may be  
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more serious for larger firms with dispersed ownership. And finally, larger firms are less 
restricted in optimise timing of their investment over time, so it may coincide with more 
cash being available. 
 
Conclusions derived from this section 
  We expect that firms, which are affiliates of foreign companies, will exhibit no 
positive link of investment to internal funds, relative to privatised and state owned 
firms. 
  The relationship between internal funds and investment in smaller firms shall be 
positive and significant, as expect that larger companies have easier access to the 
external sources of finance. 
 
5. Data set and methodology 
 
Data sources and issues 
For the empirical analysis we use annual data of enterprises in the manufacturing sector, 
collected by the Estonian Statistical Office. The database covers 1995-1999, and the 
beginning of the time period is determined by the fact that in 1995, Estonia adopted a 
new accounting law and introduced International Accounting Principles.  
The data set comprises 438 enterprises, however that includes 65 companies, for which 
1995 data is not available and 54 for which 1995 data is missing. All annual data includes 
values for stock variables both at the beginning and at the end of the period, and previous 
year end value is the same as beginning value of the subsequent year. Therefore, for 319 
firms six time points are available for stocks and five for flows, and for 119 companies 
the series is one period shorter. 
Parallel to this study, Hanula and Tamm (2002) utilises the same dataset to compare 
performance of foreign
5 and domestic companies across several dimensions and Masso 
and Heshmati (2003) aim to estimate efficiency in labour utilisation. The latter paper 
                                                           
5 Defined as companies, where the share of foreign ownership in equity exceeds 10%.  
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includes a detailed description of the dataset, therefore subsequent discussion in this 
paper will mostly focus on issues, which are most specific to our paper. 
As calculated by Masso and Heshmati (2003), the firms in the sample correspond to 
about 70% of the output of Estonian manufacturing industry. However, they also notice 
that the sample includes proportionally more large firms than small, which obviously 
biases the sample representativeness. Companies with less than 50 employees represent 
only 14% of the sample. Most companies are in branches of manufacturing, apart from 
1.9% in mining. A more detailed sectoral distribution is provided in Table 2. As by 1995, 
the privatisation process in Estonian manufacturing was almost completed, 98.4% of 
observations relate to companies, which are privately owned. Enterprises with majority 
foreign ownership represent 21.2% of the sample (see Masso and Heshmati (2003), 
Appendix 1 for more detailed distributions). 
Changes in the distribution of foreign ownership during the sample period are illustrated 
by Figure 2 below. Observations on the diagonal represent companies, where the share of 
foreign ownership remained the same at the end of the period as at the beginning. Points 
above the diagonal reflect an increase in foreign ownership, while those below the 
diagonal represent decreasing foreign ownership. There is a large number of companies, 
with no foreign ownership throughout the period (N=186), which corresponds to the 
marker at the left hand bottom corner of the graph. A number of companies retained 
100% foreign ownership throughout the period (N=30, the right hand upper corner of the 
graph) and there is handful with the same share of ownership at the beginning and at the 
end of the period (points on the diagonal). Yet, in spite of a short span of time in the 
sample, the change in ownership composition is considerable. A clear trend towards 
increasing foreign ownership is visible, as represented by the points left and above the 
diagonal. As the share of foreign ownership evolved in a significant number of 
companies, that raises a potential endogeneity problem; we will return to it in the next 
section. 
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Figure 2. Share of Foreign Capital in Equity, 1995 and 1999
 
Below, a full description of variables used in this study (Table 1-2) and some descriptive 
statistics are presented, which supplement those provided by Masso and Heshmati (2003) 
(Table 3). 
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Table 1: Variable description 
Description of variable  Details / comments 
investment  cost of increase in tangible assets during the year 
r_invest  investment deflated using manufacturing and mining price index 
correspondingly 
r_capital  net tangible assets in volume (at the end of the period), computed 
by a perpetual inventory method with a constant rate of 
depreciation (δ=8%): 
r_capitalt = (1- δ) r_capitalt-1 +r_invest 
inv_capital  r_invest / r_capital 
inv_capital_sq  in_capital squared 
sales  sales 
r_sales  sales, deflated by a corresponding price index (manufacturing or 
mining) 
labourcost  personnel expenses 
r_netsales  sales – labourcost, deflated by a corresponding price index  
netsal_cap  r_netsales / r_capital 
ni_capital  return on assets: net (after taxes) income (profit) divided by net 
tangible assets (both nominator and denominator deflated by the 
price index) 
employment  employment 
l_employment  natural logarithm of employment 
foreign_shar  share of foreign owners in equity 
dom_shar  1 – foreign_shar 
dom_x_nscap  dom_shar times netsal_cap 
recemp_x_nsc  netsal_cap divided by employment (i.e. reciprocal of employment 
times netsal_cap) 
recsal_x_nsc  netsal_cap divided by r_sales (i.e. reciprocal of r_sales times 
netsal_cap) 
doxrsaxnsc  dom_shar times recsal_x_nsc 
y1999, y1998  annual dummies 
 
The interested reader is referred to Mass and Heshmati (2002), who offers correlation 
table for main variables in the dataset. This  will not be reproduced here for space 
constraints.  
Instead we focus on the variables, which are relevant for this study. The results are 
presented in Table 2 below. 
  
15 
Table 2. Median values for selected variables over 1995-1999 
Variable  All firms  With foreign 
owners 
No foreign 
owners 
Smaller 
(below the 
median 
employment, 
i.e.<88) 
Larger (on 
and above 
the median 
employment, 
i.e. =88) 
Return on 
assets 
0.073  0.052** 0.079** 0.072  0.073 
Net sales
a / 
assets 
2.596  2.071*** 2.846*** 2.658  2.486 
Sales / assets  3.663  4.104***  2.683***  3.889†  3.548† 
Investment / 
assets 
0.264 0.243 0.276 0.279 0.255 
Employment  88 86 89    
All financial variables in 1995 prices. 
Significance levels relate to Pearson χ
2 (continuity corrected) based on the non-parametric test on the 
equality of medians. 
*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; † Significant at 0.1 
a See definition in Table 1. 
 
 
Interestingly, financial performance indicators (return on assets being the most relevant) 
are significantly higher for domestic companies, than for those with the presence of 
foreign owners. However, the average figures mask the trend: throughout the period, 
profitability of companies with foreign presence was growing in relation to domestic 
companies, as documented in more detail by Hannula and Tamm (2002) for the same 
sample. The difference between smaller and larger companies is not significant in terms 
of financial performance, apart from marginal significance of the difference in ratio of 
total sales to assets, where utilisation of assets in smaller companies seems to be more 
productive. Interestingly, the comparison of median values of employment for domestic 
and foreign companies show no difference – median employment for both groups is 
almost the same.  
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Our primary research question asks whether is there   evidence for financial constraints in 
investment behaviour. As a preliminary assessment, the question is illustrated by Figures 
3-6 below.
6  
Here, as a first approximation, correlation between investment to capital ratio and same 
period profitability will be taken as an indication of financial constraints in investment. 
First, we distinguish between observations, where foreign shareholders were not present 
(N78) and those observations where foreign owners participated as equity holders 
(N1396). The results are illustrated by Figures 3 and 4. Clearly, in the case of domestic 
companies, a correlation between current net income and investment is detectable. For 
those with the presence of foreign owners it is virtually zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
6 All four figures and corresponding correlations were based on trimmed sample: 0.05% of outliers on each 
end of the variables tails were not included. 
Figure 3. Investment & Profits: Domestic Companies
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Similarly, we split the observations into two groups according to size: (i) below the 
median value and (ii) on and above the median value (which equals 88). Again, 
correlation between current net income and investment is far more visible for larger 
companies than it is for smaller, however, the difference is somehow less pronounced 
than in the domestic – foreign cross section. 
 
Figure 4. Investment & Profits: Companies with Foreign Owners
y = 0.0099x + 0.6426
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Figure 5. Investment & Profits: Smaller Companies
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Figure 6. Investment & Profits: Larger Companies
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Sectoral contrasts 
Estonian Statistical office uses the EMTAK system of classification, which corresponds 
to ISIC Rev.3, yet longer six digit codes are used, with zeros added at the end. Most of 
the firms did not change sectoral affiliation over the five years, apart from 30 
observations (out of 2071 observations available), where for same years (typically at the 
beginning of the period) firms are classified as  ‘other service activities’ (code starting 
with 93), ‘other business activities’ (code starting with 74) or trade (codes starting with 
51 and 52). We reclassified those 30 observations based on their affiliation to a specific 
sector of manufacturing in adjacent years. Grouping firms into eight sectors (defined  
below), we created seven orthogonal contrasts coding variables in the standard way. The 
advantage of this approach is that unlike sectoral effects controlled by simple dummies, 
here, we are able to consider each effect sectoral effect independently. The distribution of 
firms and coding used for contrasts is provided in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3. Variable description: sectoral contrasts 
sectors  minhea
v 
chemical engineer food  textiles  apparel  wood  furniture 
descrip 
tion 
mining 
and 
heavy 
industry 
chemical
industry 
engineer
ing 
food 
and 
bevera-
ges 
manufac
ture of 
textiles 
wearing 
apparel 
and 
leather 
wood 
except 
furnitur
e 
manufactur
e of 
furniture 
correspo
nding 
ISIC 3 
codes 
10-14, 
27 
21-26 28-35, 
37 
15-16 17 18-19 20  36 
No of 
firms in 
the 
sample 
12 70 89 87 25 60 51  44 
coding for orthogonal contrasts: 
light  -5  -5  -5 3 3 3 3  3 
chemic  -1 7 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1  -1 
engineer  -1 -1 7 -1 -1 -1 -1  -1 
woodfurn  0 0 0 -2  -2  -2 3  3 
food  0 0 0 4 -1  -1  -1  -1 
textile  0 0 0 -1 4 -1  -1  -1 
furniture  0 0 0 0 0 0 -1  1 
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Methodology 
As already discussed, our first choice estimation method is the specification implied by 
optimisation model for investment with presence of adjustment costs (based on Euler 
equation), which does not rely on Tobin q, as the indicator is not available for our 
sample. The potential problem with estimation is that the time dimension is relatively 
short. Yet, we believe that the advantage of reference to optimisation outweight the 
problems, and we are not aware of alternatives, which we would consider superior, given 
the limitations imposed by the sample characteristics. A seminal paper that uses the Euler 
equation specification is Bond and Meghir (1994). Here we use a version of this 
specification, which assumes a competitive market, for which the term representing 
sales/assets vanishes. This seems to be a reasonable assumption for a small open 
economy such as Estonia. This is essentially, the version of Euler equation that Lizal and 
Svenjar (2002) utilises (apart from interactive effects we added, see below). 
 
Our chosen estimation technique is the Generalised Method of Moments. In their seminal 
paper Arellano and Bond (1991) find that GMM is superior to simpler instrumental 
variable estimators and recommend one step GMM for inference (Ibidem, p.293). More 
recently, Judson and Owen (1999) support the conclusion that this estimation method is 
superior as compared with feasible alternatives for panels with a short time dimension. 
The GMM estimator is robust in that it does not require information of the exact 
distribution of the disturbances and is instrumental in combating the problems associated 
with potential endogenity
7. Similar conclusions can be found in Bond (2002): the one 
step estimator is superior to the two step version, as the latter technique offers very 
modest efficiency gains, and more importantly the asymptotic distribution is less reliable 
under the two step method (Ibidem, p.9). Despite the efficiency of GMM, there is one 
qualification to make: when the instruments that are available are weak, large finite 
sample biases may occur as a result (Ibidem, p.26). Several other researchers of firm 
investment behaviour have used the GMM technique, for example Konings et al. (2002) 
and Bond et al. (1999). 
                                                           
7 We refer the interested reader to Lee (2002) for more details on the GMM technique.  
21 
 
One critical issue in methodology is how to distinguish between companies, which may 
be financially constrained because of their specific characteristics, and those which 
would not. Creating a  robust econometric design for testing for the difference is not a  
trivial issue. Amongst others, Schiantarelli (1996) in his review of methodology of 
investment studies notes that it is common for researchers to split samples on the basis of 
whether a firm belongs to a financially constrained or unconstrained group. Usually this 
is done on the basis of dividend pay out, ownership or firm size. However, in practice, 
those characteristic are typically time variant and such should be the basis for splitting 
the sample, allowing the firms to transit between different states (Schiantarelli 1996, 
p78). Moreover, the sample splitting criterion is likely to be correlated with firm specific 
and time invariant component of the error term. One simple solution to this, may be to 
use contemporaneous information to partition the observations, and used lagged 
information as instruments within the GMM context (Ibid., p78). One of few studies 
which heeds to this advice is Bond and Meghir (1994) who use a dummy variable which 
allows firms to transit between constrained and unconstrained states, whilst employing 
the GMM technique. We address the problem in a similar way. We are interested if the 
smaller size of the company and lower level of foreign shareholdings result in financial 
constraints. And instead of the time-invariant sample split, we introduce interactive 
effects, that is we multiply our measure of cash flow by a domestic sharehodings and by 
reciprocal of size (see Table 1 for definitions). Those two new variables are treated as 
endogeneus the same way as all other variables in the model, apart from sectoral 
contrasts and time effects. 
 
Specifications 
 
As discussed, we apply a version of the Euler equation. In case of Estonia it is legitimate 
to assume competitive markets, which implies that the output term vanishes from the 
specification. Subsequently, our first specification corresponds to the equation estimated 
by Lizal and Svejnar (2002; equation (6)), apart from the fact that our additional vector of 
control variables utilises orthogonal contrasts, as described above.  
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1. General equation 
it
t t t t
contrasts toral
dummies year cap netsal sq capit inv capital inv t cons capital inv
ε +
+ + + + + = − − −
_ sec
_ _ _ _ _ tan _ 1 1 1  
 
Next, to check if the impact of cash flow is significant, we interact the cash flow variable 
with our two ‘prime suspects’, i.e. the size of domestic owners in equity and reciprocal of 
size. The two new variables are instrumented the same way as all other, by past levels 
(i.e. standard Arrellano-Bond (1991) method), thus also treated as endogenous. This   
results in the following equations. 
 
2. Equation with ownership and size interactions with cash flow (size approximated by 
employment) 
it
t t t t
contrasts toral dummies year
nsc x recemp nscap x dom cap netsal sq capit inv capital inv t cons capital inv
ε + +
+ + + + + + = − − −
_ sec _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ tan _ 1 1 1
 
3. Equation with ownership and size interactions with cash flow (size approximated by 
real sales) 
it
t t t t
contrasts toral dummies year
nsc x recsal nscap x dom cap netsal sq capit inv capital inv t cons capital inv
ε + +
+ + + + + + = − − −
_ sec _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ tan _ 1 1 1  
 
Finally, we checked if domestic ownership interacts with size, i.e. if impact of foreign 
ownership is either enhanced or decreased for larger companies. 
 
4. Equation with additional interaction including both ownership and size 
it
t t t t
contrasts toral dummies year doxrsaxnsc
nsc x recsal nscap x dom cap netsal sq capit inv capital inv t cons capital inv
ε + + +
+ + + + + + = − − −
_ sec _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ tan _ 1 1 1  
 
Variants of these equations included testing if results were sensitive to lag structure, to 
different treatment of controls (standard sectoral dummies instead of controls), and to the 
introduction of foreign share and size directly in an ad hoc augmented equation. All 
results are available on request.  
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We also tested if the equations hold, when we split the sample between the light industry 
(the largest relatively homogeneus sectoral group in our sample) and all others. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
Basic results are presented in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4. GMM (Arellano-Bond) Estimations. Dependent Variable: inv_capitalt 
 
*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; * Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1
  (1)  (2) (2a)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
inv_capitalt-1  .157 (.040)***  .163 (.041)***  .169 (.041)***  .165 (.041)***  .165 (.041)***  .104 (.033)**  .155 (.040)***  .160 (.041)*** 
inv_capit_sqt-1  -.0003 (0)***  -.0004 (0)***  -.0004 (0)***  -.0004 (0)***  -.0004 (0)***  -.0002 (0)**  -.0003 (0)***  -.0004 (0)*** 
netsal_capt  -.018 (.005)***  -.079 (.027)**  -.077 (.027)**  -.069 (.022)**  -.061 (.023)**  -.080 (.023)***  -.018 (.005)**  -.075 (.027)** 
dom_x_nscapt         .165    (.022)***    
dom_x_nscapt-1    .058 (.026)*  .056 (.026)*  .047 (.022)*  .038 (.028)  .064 (.022)**    .055 (.026)* 
recemp_x_nsct         8.46  (1.04)***    
recemp_x_nsct-1    .816 (.326)*  .794 (.325)*      .416 (.275)    .729 (.333)* 
recsal_x_nsct-1      72.23  (22.45)***  46.39  (60.17)      
doxrsaxnsc        40.02  (84.62)      
dom_shar           .503  (.898)   
l_employment           -.516  (.367)  -.322  (.378) 
c_light  -.018 (.074)  -.022 (.074)    -.021 (.074)  -.021 (.074)  .015 (.062)  -.017 (.074)  -.021 (.074) 
c_chemic  .055 (.076)  .046 (.077)    .048 (.077)  .048 (.077)  .061 (.064)  .054 (.077)  .047 (.077) 
c_engineer  -.015 (.075)   -.014 (.076)    -.015 (.076)  -.015 (.076)  .015 (.064)  -.014 (.076)  -.014  (.076) 
c_woodfurn  -.099 (.051)  -.110 (.053)    -.124 (.053)*  -.123 (.053)*  -.100 (.044)*  -.098 (.052)†  -.106  (.053)* 
c_food  .003 (.051)  .001 (.051)    -.015 (.052)  -.015 (.052)  .038 (.044)  .003 (.051)  .002 (.051) 
c_textile  .042 (.077)  .055 (.078)    .038 (.078)  .038 (.078)  .046 (.066)  .049 (.079)  .055 (.078) 
c_furnit  .091 (.166)  .135 (.169)    .139 (.169)  .140 (.169)  .079 (.142)  .118 (.169)  .140 (.169) 
y1998  -.246 (.357)  -.265 (.363)  -.289 (.363)  -.267 (.362)  -.272 (.362)  -.206 (.304)  -.190 (.364)  -.220 (.366) 
y1999  .035 (304)  .024 (.310)  -.004 (.309)  .025 (.309)  .012 (.309)  -.014 (.260)  .082 (.310)  .048 (.311) 
constant  -.173 (.231)  -.134 (.236)  -.102 (.227)  -.143 (.235)  -.132 (.236)  .216 (.198)  -.175 (.234)  -.143 (.236) 
Test for no 
second-order 
autocorrelation:z 
.57  .45 .26 .51  .51 .57  .52 .49 
Sargan test: χ
2 
(over-identifying 
restrictions) 
2.20 .39 .46 .35  .33 .91  2.10  .44 
Number of 
observations 
1143  1130 1130 1133  1133 1129  1130 1130 
Number  of  firms  434  431 431 432  432 431  431 431  
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Column 1 corresponds to core the Euler equation specification (equation 1 above). All 
variables have the expected sign and are highly significant. That itself can be taken as 
evidence that the financing in Estonia is relatively efficient and there is no indication of 
strong financial constraints. In particular, this conclusion is implied by the fact that while 
the Euler equation model predicts a negative sign on the cash flow coefficient, the 
financing constraint would imply positive and significant sign. 
Yet the conclusion implied by estimation presented in Column 1 has to be qualified as 
soon as we account for heterogeneity between different categories of companies. In 
contrast to aggregate results in Column 1, specification in Column 2 (based on equation 2 
above) interacts a cash flow term with both the share of domestic owners and with 
reciprocal of employment. While the basic variables from the Euler model preserve their 
sign and significance, we now have positive and significant signs for interactive effects. 
The conclusion is that while overall, the financing constraints are not acute, they emerge 
for particular types of companies. A smaller presence of foreign owners make a firm 
more susceptible to constraints in financing.  As does smaller size. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the core cash flow effect is now much higher and remain negative, so 
correcting for the heterogeneity in firm types clarify the results. 
In columns 2a and 3 of Table 4 offer additional checks of these conclusions. Column 2a 
corresponds to the specification, where we check if the results are robust to 
inclusion/exclusion of sectoral controls and the answer is clearly no. The coefficients are 
remarkably stable. In column 3 (corresponding to equation 3 above), we use an 
alternative measure of size that is company sales (in constant prices) in the interactive 
effect. The results are not affected. Level of sales and level of employment as a measure 
of size can be given a slightly different interpretation. In the latter case, one could 
interpret the effects of size as being of ‘political economy’ nature: bigger firms may be 
given some additional support from the government, to avoid large redundancies (but this 
is unlikely in case of Estonia). Yet, as the results are robust to replacing employment by 
the level of sales as a proxy for size. 
In column 4 (presented as equation 4 above) we experiment with an additional ‘second 
order’ interactive term, to find out if the lack of presence of foreign owners is more acute 
when combined with small size of the companies. For this type of specification,  
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multicollinearity between the three interactive terms become a problem and it is no 
surprise that significance levels collapse for those variables. Nevertheless, we get some 
indication that the joint effect of these two factors may have additional negative effects. 
In the case of small companies with no foreign owners there seem to be some weak 
additional effect enhancing credit constraints, but it is estimated in very imprecise way. 
Columns 5 and 6 provide some additional checks.  
In column 5 we introduce contemporary values in addition to lagged interactive terms, to 
see how that impacts on our results. The answer is very little, apart from the fact that now 
the contemporary effect of size-cash flow interactive term dominates the lagged one.  
Next, we check if our significant results for the two interactive terms used so far were not 
enforced as a substitute for simple effects of the variables used to construct those terms. 
Therefore, we replace interactive effects by simple effects /i/ of both shareholding 
composition between domestic and foreign owners and /ii/ of size. The results are 
presented in Column 6. As reported there, when those two variables are introduced 
directly in an augmented form of Euler equation model, we may see that both are 
insignificant. The composition of shareholding is highly insignificant, thus it has no 
impact on investment rate, a result that is consistent with median test presented in Table 3 
above. The variable has also positive sign, in contrast with interactive specification. 
Thus, we hope it is highly unlikely that we misinterpret our results related to the domestic 
versus foreign ownership split. The situation is slightly more complicated in the case of 
direct size effect, which is only marginally insignificant and has the sign corresponding 
to the interactive term (i.e. a negative sign for l_employment  is consistent with the 
positive sign of the reciprocal of employment, which was used in interactive term). 
Therefore, we present an additional check to see if we do not enforce the result for 
interactive effect with size, by omitting the size variable. In Column 7 we present an 
additional specification where both interactive term for size and simple size effects are 
present. Clearly, the interactive terms survive the treatment as significant with expected 
sign. 
Table 5 presents an additional test for robustness. There is a number of observation (32), 
with state majority shareholdings. In the estimations above we defined them jointly as 
domestic shareholding, merging the corresponding shares with private domestic owners.  
27 
Our motivation was twofold. First, if we focus on the distinction between foreign and 
domestic companies, we may expect state owned companies being more similar to other 
domestic companies. And second and more importantly, we know from the literature on 
privatisation, that the impact of privatisation may be traced already before the formal date 
of ownership transfer (see: Megginson and Netter 2001 for overview). The observations 
in this group all relate to pre-privatisation. Nevertheless, for the sake of transparency we 
also performed the tests with all observations with state majority removed from the 
sample. The results are presented in Table 5, columns 1-5. Very little changes and both 
signs and size of the coefficients remain very similar to corresponding columns of Table 
4. 
Finally, we experimented with breaking the sample along the sectoral lines. That was 
rather unsuccessful. As the sample size shrank, it is became difficult to obtain estimates 
that pass structural tests, as GMM is sensitive to small sample size. One sector, for which 
we are able to obtain consistent estimates is engineering, but even then, both the Sargan 
test and test for second order autocorrelation are only just above the critical levels. 
Nevertheless, we may see that while the size of the coefficients change, the signs do not 
and the basic logic of the model is preserved on the sectoral level (those results are 
available on request). 
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Table 5. GMM (Arellano-Bond) Estimations. Dependent Variable: inv_capitalt. 
Observations with state majority shareholding excluded 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 
inv_capitalt-1  .160 (.040)***  .163 (.040)***  .163 (.040)***  .100 (.032)**  .159 (.040)*** 
inv_capit_sqt-1  -.0004 (0)***  -.0003 (0)***  -.0004 (0)***  -.0002   (0)**  -.0004   (0)*** 
netsal_capt  -.079 (.027)**  -.070 (.022)**  -.062 (.027)*  -.080 (.022)***  -.077 (.027)** 
dom_x_nscapt      .176  (.021)***   
dom_x_nscapt-1  .058 (.026)*  .048 (.021)*  .039 (.028)  .064 (.021)**  .056 (.026)* 
recemp_x_nsct      8.40  (1.00)***   
recemp_x_nsct-1  .813 (.321)*      .401 (.265)  .755 (.328)* 
recsal_x_nsct-1    72.86 (22.06)***  47.48 (59.11)     
doxrsaxnsc     39.35  (83.16)     
dom_shar         
l_employment        -.216  (.376) 
c_light  -.019  (.080)  -.017 (.080)  -.018 (.080)  .0152 (.065)  -.019  (.080) 
c_chemic  .028 (.082)  .030 (.082)  .031 (.082)  .038 (.067)  .028 (.082) 
c_engineer  -.013 (.081)  -.014 (.081)  -.014 (.081)  .014 (.067)  -.014 (.081) 
c_woodfurn  -.111 (.052)*  -.126 (.052)*  -.124 (.052)*  -.099 (.043)*  -.108 (.052)* 
c_food  .003 (.052)  -.014 (.052)  -.014 (.052)  .037 (.043)  .003 (.052) 
c_textile  .054 (.077)  .037 (.077)  .037 (.077)  .047 (.064)  .054 (.077) 
c_furnit  .135 (.166)  .140 (.166)  .140 (.166)  .075 (.137)  .139 (.166) 
y1998  -.333 (.363)  -.334 (.362)  -.339 (.362)  -.260 (.298)  -.303 (.366) 
y1999  .029 (.310)  .030 (.309)  .016 (.310)  .011 (.255)  .044 (.311) 
constant  -.134  (.241)  -.145 (.240)  -.133 (.241)  .217 (.198)  -.139 (.241) 
Test for no 
second-order 
autocorrelation:z 
.42 .63  .47 1.22 .41 
Sargan test: χ
2 
(over-identifying 
restrictions) 
.51 .41  .41 .55  .57 
Number of 
observations 
1100 1103  1103 1099  1100 
Number of firms  427  428  428  427  427 
*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; * Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Arguably, consistent estimates of the investment model based on Euler equations may be 
interpreted as evidence for the fact that financing of enterprises in one of the leading 
transition economies has been operating relatively efficiently already in the late 1990’s. 
Yet,  as soon as we account for the heteregeneity of firms, clear differences emerge. Lack 
of foreign ownership produces a clear disadvantage in finance, making it more dependent 
on internal cash flow. Similarly, small companies seem to be financially constrained. And 
there is some weak evidence that a combination of those two effects is particularly 
harmful: small domestic companies are especially constrained in their access to finance.  
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As support for development of small enterprises is now one of the major themes of 
economic policy, this research may provide some food for thought for policy makers. 
Uneven access to finance may be one of the factors, which could result in dual industrial 
structure, with a visible split between the foreign affiliated companies, which face easier 
opportunities for growth and developments and underdeveloped sector of small domestic 
companies. 
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